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INTRODUCTION: ELEMENTS IN AN APPROACH TO HUMAN DEVELOPMENT
Three areas for constructive work on human development are much discussed: what are the values which should define and guide human development; what are causes and barriers for human development; and how can we operationalize a theorised approach (a package of concepts, values, and explanatory theories) in terms of measurement, instruments and policy priorities. There are also three less discussed but essential counterpart areas of work. First, operationalization requires not just measurement but institutionalization, including establishing and sustaining a programme of research for action, and attracting and keeping the support of a body of researchers and potential users. Second, an ongoing research and policy programme of human development, and action on its findings, requires a basis of widespread public commitment and concern.
Lastly, without rich observation and evidence, each of the required commitment, concern, ethical theory and positive theory are likely to be weak and insufficient. Table   1 highlights these six areas. 
 Judicious strategy and tactics
A theory of human development needs thus to be more than only a theory in welfare economics or ethics. Amartya Sen's capability approach arose in response to
the question of what is the appropriate space for evaluating people's advantage and the distribution of advantages ('equality of what?') . A human development theory or approach has further purposes besides evaluation and so requires additional types of information. Sen has extended his capability approach considerably, notably in
DIVERSE STAGES IN PRACTICAL DISCOURSE REQUIRE DIVERSE METHODS
The more types of purpose one has, the more types of evidence, conceptualization and theorization one must use. Consider a series of stages or foci in practical ethics:-exposure to real cases; trying to grasp and interpret them using readily available 'everyday' ideas;
trying to build general concepts or theory, if and when felt necessary; returning to analyse real cases using such tools from theory; and making and acting on practical choices. More simply we might refer to three broad stages: induction, theorization, and decisionmaking/action. These different purposes and stages of thought are found to involve different styles of case-use and argumentation (Gasper 2000a ).
Induction involves reflecting on experiences of real people, preferably through striking, absorbing, accessible examples. Cases can sensitize people to situations, issues, and ethical claims; build fellow-feeling; and convey notions about what is good.
To do this they must be vivid, engrossing, and typically about real or plausible people.
'Constitutive narratives' for example, says Benner, are stories which 'exemplify positive notions about what is good ' (1991: 2) , they convey core values within an area of practice and help to motivate and sustain its practitioners.
The immediacy and force of a story, a real case, outdoes any general statement.
It contextualizes, and adds personal flavour and credibility. Anecdotes too, not only thick rich narratives, may do part of this and do so with great economy. Brief anecdotes give no answers, at least no reliable ones; but they can establish a felt connection and help to open hearts and minds. The Voices of the Poor study (e.g., Narayan et al. 2000) lacks holistic narratives-people's comments were processed and pigeonholed-but some of its quotations pierce like a knife.
Theorizing, whether theory-building or the 'modelling' of a particular case, typically calls for more abstracted thought, with exclusions and simplifications to allow systematic analysis of or with the remaining factors. Often excluded will be details about people which could distract the analyser and distort her analysis. Sometimes the cases considered are wholly imaginary.
The cases which are looked at to support decision-making and action should typically again be real and often detailed, to convey the complexity of contexts and to show, in 'learning narratives' (Benner 1991) , the skills needed to act on values. Such stories bring emotions which are remembered too, which helps in later recall and activation of the skills, in action. We change our moral views especially by experiences which strongly involve our emotions, says Nussbaum. Ideally such emotions and stories, sometimes of inspiring personal exemplars, help to build commitment as well as skills.
This general principle that ethics and practical discourse include a variety of activities, which have distinct purposes and different appropriate methods, informs
Nussbaum's work. It lends the work unusual richness and insight. Her capabilities approach thus involves much more than a list of specific priorities in or for human lives. In a preliminary description, one could say that it also involves:
 A wide-angle but focussed vision, looking at the content and potentials in key aspects of people's lives, all people's lives. Her list of priority capabilities fits here.
 A way of looking, within the field of vision, with openness and sympathy. The list of priority capabilities embodies a basic theme: insistence on respect for all persons, as our starting point, from which culturally diverse interpretations and historically specific negotiations will proceed; rather than starting our public reasoning from whatever biased cultural and historical orderings hold sway.
 Use of a wider range of evidence, including richer sources-fiction, poetry, autobiographies, and now also interviews and open-ended observation-than those used in economics and much other work on living standards.
 A deeper way of understanding: using rich pictures of mind, personhood, emotions and language; and a richer style of presentation, that seeks to explore the human content of evidence, including its emotional content, to build concern both for persons and for particular aspects of life. 
MAPPING NUSSBAUM'S CAPABILITIES APPROACH
The evolution of Nussbaum's capabilities approach since the early 1990s (Gasper 1997: 299 ). Yet, Nussbaum's work from that period (Nussbaum 1988 (Nussbaum , 1992 (Nussbaum , 1993 (Nussbaum , 1995a (Nussbaum , 1995b ) often raised misgivings: '…a "top-table", still too disciplinary, and emphatically Aristotelian style might bring not just substantive intellectual shortcomings, but antagonize others and thus short-circuit the debate it sought to advance' (Gasper 1997: 300 Gasper 1997 Gasper , 2002 Gasper , 2007a , especially within the first three aspects, and I will not attempt to discuss all the elements in detail here. The main purpose of the tables is instead to organize the comparison and to bring out some less familiar elements.
Several of these concern roles and method, and will be presented in Table 4 . 
Emphasis on freedom
Very high. Includes stress on the instrumental value of freedom, in addition to its independent value and its constructive value (i.e. role in building validated moral conclusions). Emphasis on freedom as choice and on 'Development as Freedom'. Strong focus also on justice. Relatively little on care.
High.
5
Less focus on behaviour in markets; more stress than Sen on law, emotional development, etc. Emphasis on freedom as selfmastery? 'Development as Human Decency and Human Flourishing'. Strong focus on justice. Substantial attention also to care. 5 Nussbaum can be as strong as Sen in the degree of normative priority she declares for capabilities (WHD, p.63, calls capabilities 'the', not 'a' relevant space for comparisons of quality of life; see also pp. . This priority to capabilities is more plausible for prescription, and less often so for evaluation, where the case for attention to functionings is often high. She exaggerates the case against requiring certain functionings (such requirements are widespread, e.g. in road use; p.88), but elsewhere does note cases where mandatory functioning is justified (often for children, health, safety, and various duties; 2000b: 130-1). Her principle of equal capability applies only up to the level of the decent minimum. Like Sen she certainly gives weight to other distributive principles too, as seen in her discussions of cases. (Nussbaum 2000a:14) Capabilities approach as explicitly a human rights approach (Nussbaum 2006) ; 'a basis for central constitutional principles ' (2000a:12) . Basic rights are to threshold levels for priority capabilities.
C. CAPABILITY APPROACH COMPONENTS
SEN NUSSBAUM
7c. Thresholds (prescriptive basic needs)
Nussbaum suggests 'Sen nowhere uses the idea of a threshold ' (2000a:12) . Rather, he sometimes uses it, but does not specify thresholds unilaterally.
Priority goes to achieving basic threshold levels. This ranks above the expansion of opportunities beyond those levels for richer others.
7d. Security
Required for priority capabilities (CHS 2003) Required for priority capabilities (Nussbaum 2011: 145) 
Concepts of capability
A merit of Nussbaum's version compared to Sen's has been the distinctions she makes between types of capability, even though her labels may be questioned (Gasper 1997 (Gasper & 2002 . She uses 'basic capability' to refer to undeveloped potentials; the label 'basic' is, however, ambiguous and is often used by others normatively rather than, as here, positively. She uses 'internal capability' for developed skills; but 'basic' capabilities too are internal to people. Earlier she used the label of 'external capability'
for the attainable options which people have (plain 'capabilities' in Sen's informal usage) given their 'internal capabilities' and the relevant external conditions. Her newer label, 'combined capability', captures the relevance of both sets of factors but could bring misleading connotations too. And she uses 'central capability' for a priority-status attainable option, though again 'central' is an ambiguous term. The adjective 'priority'
could be more transparent. Nussbaum does of course make a claim for the instrumental and normative centrality of the key capabilities that she lists. They are held to be valued in themselves, necessary features of being fully human, and instrumentally central for any life (2000a: 74) . Table 3 sums up this set of terms, in comparison with Sen's terms, everyday language, and a possible alternative set of labels. Whatever the labels are, Nussbaum helps us to think more clearly about four importantly different concepts. 
The proposed list of priority capabilities
Nussbaum's exercise in theory building aims to identify a largely consensual or persuasive list of universal priority (opportunity-) capabilities. Why? She notes that the list is permanently open to debate and re-making, and to local interpretation and threshold-setting (e.g., thresholds are 'set by internal political processes in each nation, often with the contribution of a process of judicial review ', 2001a: 418) . So why try to personally specify such a list? The answers implied seem to be that without a highlighted indicative set of candidate entrenched priorities we leave too much open to self-interested interpretation by the powerful; and that Nussbaum seeks to convey a method of thinking, with principles of procedure and selection, for developing such a priority set. Rather than being an exercise in monological elite rule, such a priority list will suggest a starting point and ground for a bill of rights, part of a legal constitution.
'Human rights are, in effect, justified claims to such basic capabilities or opportunities' (1999a: 87). Nussbaum's greater emphasis previously on Aristotelianism than on the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, plus other aspects of her earlier style, contributed to the still recurrent charges of elitism.
Her list highlights capacities and opportunities to choose. Some critics propose that it is illiberal to insist that people must have choice and the capacities for choice.
But choice includes the option to choose a way of life which is without choice (within a religious order, for example). She provides examples of well-educated women who choose to wear a burka although not obliged to, and of some who make that choice after a period living without the burka; but who do not insist that others should be deprived of the choice and obliged to wear the burka (e.g., 2000a: 153). Similarly she gives striking examples of people celebrating their increased field of choice, such as thanks to literacy.
Nussbaum sometimes evinces optimism about convergence on a consensus core set of capabilities, and is surprisingly optimistic about the impacts of oppression on preferences and acceptance (e.g., 'regimes that fail to deliver health, or basic security, or liberty are unstable ' -2000a: 155) . Are her views and proposed priorities really a wide consensus? While Gayatri Spivak (1999) for one suggests not, the priorities seem compatible with the huge Voices of the Poor study (Narayan et al., 2000) . But her list in any case rests not primarily on current opinion polls, but on a proposed criterion of what are those for higher levels of flourishing, including critical autonomy?-and a more explicit and structured method of application, which proceeds back down a chain of causation from desirable functionings to required capabilities to commodity characteristics to specific satisfiers to implied societal preconditions (see also Gough 2000 Gough , 2013 Gasper 1996) . Nussbaum lacks this structure and thus her list becomes a more personal selection of priorities from across several of these levels.
So, Nussbaum's work can be seen as justifying a bill of rights; but is less rigorous and elaborated than Doyal and Gough's parallel work, which corroborates but upgrades the approach behind her list. Why then has Nussbaum's work had more attention and impact? Part of the reason is that Nussbaum more strongly embeds her means of prioritization into a larger humanistic project. While her prioritization methods may be less refined, she has elaborated additional methods which address much else of what we require in human development ethics, as we will see later.
The theory needs refinement in some other respects too. Any theory faces difficult boundary cases. Nussbaum's requires qualification for cases beyond its core focus of the adult householder citizen, such as the seriously disabled or 'differently abled' for whom some capabilities are out of reach (see Nussbaum 2006) ; and for the half of humankind who are children or infirm. Nussbaum provides some of these qualifications, in a practical style enriched by her legal studies. She considers the case of religious celibates, who seem to reject that 'it is always rational to want [all the specified core human capabilities] whatever else one wants ' (2000a:88) ; and argues that they rationally would want the sexual and other opportunities whose use they reject, for only thus does their sexual and other abstinence acquire meaning. Many hermits may disagree. She argues that hermits in fact seek affiliation to others, by praying for others or indirectly promoting universal spiritual upliftment. But some hermits seek no societal affiliation, no human betterment, only an affiliation to some notion of the divine.
Nussbaum has here two ways forward open to her, not mutually exclusive. She could take the main path followed by Doyal & Gough: establishing and promoting the needs implied by a more restricted, sharper normative criterion. She can then avoid insisting that hermits want or logically should want sexual opportunities. Secondly, if she wishes to continue to work with the more extensive and vaguer criterion of human decency or dignity-less extensive and vague than the 'good life' criterion expounded in her early 1990s work but still not likely to give a tidy list of ten-then the theory requires fuzzier specification. The international human rights tradition and the global ethics movement of Hans Küng and others help to convey how a fuzzy theory can still valuably structure ongoing areas of debate, guide choices, and respect and face differences. Nussbaum already identifies two of her central capabilities-affiliation and practical reason-as more central than others; and comparably there can be some marginal cases and the list will have no sharp end point. Some of the proposed priority capabilities might be better seen as important desiderata than as absolute requirements (Crocker 1995; Gasper 1997) . In this second option the list could be presented as an exemplar of a methodology which offers a framework for dialogical investigation and practical specification (cf. Alkire 2002) . Otherwise it arouses fears in some people of a preemptive bid to capture the ear of metropolitan power-holders.
A list should be theorized and relativized by identifying and highlighting the roles it is meant to serve. Nussbaum has argued that a list is important not only as a counterweight to power in distribution processes within an established political community, but also more generally promotes sympathetic recognition of and attention to other humans. If we see the list as a method, or part of a method or family of methods within an approach, then we can think about its functions and then about how to construct and use it. The list is a means not an end; if we focus on the ends we can sometimes find suitable alternative or supplementary or modified means. The many valuable aspects in the overall capabilities approach should not be obscured by reduction of the approach to a quest for one specification of this one element.
Roles more broadly
A conscious role of Sen's capability approach is to increase the range of types of information which we use, in order to provide a more adequate evaluative accounting. He later highlighted a second role: to provide underpinnings for conceptions of human rights. Nussbaum shares these aims. She highlights too a sister to the role of mobilizing more relevant information, namely: to provide a relevant language to express people's own multi-faceted concerns better than do measures of income and utility (2000b: 138-9). Next, the evaluative accounter, not merely his present accounting, can be affected by the choice of language. Two more roles of Nussbaum's approach are thus: to make observers more open, through this enriched perception of the content of lives; and, it is hoped, to build sympathy and commitment.
Imaginatively 'standing in other people's shoes' can change you, not only your information set.
Nussbaum-who was an actress in an early stage of her career-is more conscious or explicit than Sen about these later roles. While Sen rightly points out that goodwill exists, contrary to the assumptions and influence of much economics, he considers less the methods by which it might be fostered and defended. Yet it often exists only as a thing of rags and tatters. He has advanced a hypothesis that public information in a democracy prevents famines, but this presumes that the informed majority will care about a threatened minority. The hypothesis therefore fails in some cases intra-nationally, as well as of course inter-nationally. The method components overlap and mutually reinforce each other, but each deserves separate specification, as in Table 4 . A broad informational base and rich detail in presentation can contribute to empathy, being able to understand others' feelings; and to sympathy, seeing with concern, caring. However: 'Whether such empathy will promote compassion on the part of insiders or outsiders…will depend on our judgements of seriousness, responsibility, and appropriate concern' (Nussbaum 2001a: 440) . And whether compassion leads to caring action depends also on will, and on views about transjurisdictional duties and the respective roles of different bodies. central focus is as a theorist, whose work is enriched by and enriches empirical observation and policy analysis (Gasper 2008 ). Nussbaum's list is an attempt to ensure that such empirical and policy work attends to key dimensions of human existence. Her methodology centres on detailed reflection on 'life-size' cases which involve recognizably real people, whether truly real or literary creations. In the Aristotelian tradition such extended treatment of cases is held to foster ethical discernment (Nussbaum 1999b The stylized comparison above of Sen and Nussbaum has brought out in particular that Nussbaum's approach contains not only arguments against ethical relativism and for a universal priorities list, but has a range of purposes and corresponding methods which demand examination as central to her project. The second half of the paper explores this agenda, and discusses how Nussbaum uses her declared methods.
NUSSBAUM AND ETHICS METHODOLOGY: OF STORIES AND EMOTIONS
Nussbaum advocates a wide but focussed vision that covers key aspects of people's lives and sustains attention to the human significance of evidence, including its emotional content. She proposes empathy and shows how it links to compassion. In all these respects she in large part does what she advocates. But one also encounters repeatedly expressed dissatisfactions with her range of evidence, range of interlocutors, and style of debate.
A full discussion would assess each of Nussbaum's proposals on method, including in relation to her purposes, and assess her practice against her theories. We would look at her investigation of emotions less comforting than sympathy, but equally fundamental: fear, disgust and shame. Here we must be selective. We will consider her examination and application of the key emotion of compassion, and her use of rich human narratives; the extent of her intellectual sources, including her relatively limited field exposure and collaborations; and an occasionally still over-confrontational argumentative style.
Sympathy and commitment, compassion and mercy
An enormous virtue of Nussbaum's work lies in its attention to emotions, including to their roles in ethical judgement and ethical action. She considers too their dangers, distortions and determinants. Emotions figure as central capability no.5 in her list (2011: 33-4) , and are involved in items 7-9: affiliation, play, and relations with other species. 6 To describe and explain, and to persuade and act effectively, we need to understand, employ and influence much besides 'utility' and 'preference'. Not least, we need more attention to the realms of care, besides the realms of freedom and of justice (van Staveren 2001) , and to issues touched on by Sen in the 1970s under the labels 'sympathy' and 'commitment' (Sen 2005; Gasper 2007b ). Nussbaum has gone much further in this direction, drawing on wider sources.
Sen stressed the presence and importance of motives other than self-interest. In his usage, 'sympathy' meant felt satisfaction which is derived from seeing or contributing to the well-being of others; and 'commitment' meant the willingness to act towards goals other than the agent's own well-being, including the well-being of others, even though this will not raise and might diminish the agent's well-being. Sen's distinctions perhaps still reflected the mould of utilitarianism: only one type of felt satisfaction was recognized. A concern for others which did not make the agent happy was then not seen as sympathy, even though the word's parts (sym-pathy) suggest feeling-with. 'Commitment' remained a disconnected, somewhat mysterious category.
Nussbaum points out that 'one cannot fully articulate Sen's own more complex predictive and normative theory of reasoning without prominently including the emotions in which parts of that reasoning are embodied ' (2001a: 392 Nussbaum distinguishes empathy, the ability to imagine the experience of another person, from compassion, seen as concern ('a painful emotion') 'at another person's undeserved misfortune ' (2001a: 301) . She takes sympathy to be coterminous with compassion, or a mild version of it; and avoids the term pity, deeming it now tainted by condescension. Aristotle described compassion as concern for the misfortune of another person, arising when that misfortune is seen by the observer as (1) major, (2) undeserved, and (3) of a type which could happen to himself. Nussbaum endorses the first two posited parts, but gives good reasons to consider the third a relevant contributory factor but not a necessary feature. She replaces it with (3*): the misfortune happens to someone (or some being) who figures within the observer's universe of concern. The re-specification seems meant as an empirical description; it is not argued like a typical definition, in terms of convention, etymology or logic, but on the basis of flourishing must be distinguished, Sen would say; for we can sacrifice ourselves for others and for ideals.
cases of real or imagined feelings. The diagnosis helps Nussbaum find impediments to compassion: fear of acquiring duties to help (2001b: xxxvii); and envy, shame and disgust, which belittle others' sufferings or exclude them from one's universe of concern (2001a: 423). It also implies ways to try to promote appropriate compassion, by spreading more adequate theories of (1) ethical importance, (2) causation and desert, and (3) the scope of ethical community.
We can question Aristotle's second component too, the idea that compassion does not apply to deserved misfortune. In this case the component is stipulated by
Nussbaum as part of her definition, but that seems to exceed most ordinary usage. The term 'compassion'-to feel with or for another's suffering; 'pity inclining one to help or be merciful' (Oxford Dictionary)-does not by etymology or convention imply that the suffering must be undeserved (see also Comte-Sponville 2002: 106 ff.), though that is certainly a reinforcing factor, as in the case of children in very poor countries.
Nussbaum refines her stipulation in two important ways: if the misfortune is excessive compared to the misdemeanour, or if the misdemeanour is related to factors beyond the agent's control, then compassion can arise.
Compassion is for a victim, mercy is for a culprit, says Nussbaum. Mercy is benevolence toward a culpable but partly condonable wrong-doer. But in effect we can extend compassion to a culprit if we see damage which he has earlier suffered. He may be held only partially blameworthy, and hence deserving compassion if he has been punished as if fully responsible. In a fine essay on 'Equity and Mercy' (1999a: Ch.6) Nussbaum relates mercy to an attention to the particular circumstances and detailed histories of persons, such as provided in rich, realistic novels, depth journalism and humanistic anthropology. We come to see the forces, complexities and chances, often beyond the control of individuals, which contribute to misfortunes and misdemeanours.
Whether one factor forms grounds for mitigation or for the opposite depends on its combination with the other factors, so: 'Telling the whole story, with all the particulars, is the only way to get at that ' (1999a: 177) . Further, punishment is not determined exclusively by the degree of mitigation, but also by concerns like deterrence and the other effects and costs; and compassion does not logically imply that we must act to remedy a situation, for that depends also on the likely effects and costs of the attempt.
The implication is that we may not need to be so wary of feeling compassion. We can show compassion to those whom we consider in error. Her explorations of imaginative literature help to show how.
Ethical insights from thick-textured humanist narratives
In  They present 'a style of human relating in which…moral attitudes are made more generous by the play of the imagination ' (1998: 234) , thus contributing to a habit of considering that the other 'has a complex inner life, in some ways mysterious, in some ways like [one's] own ' (1995c: 38) . This reaching behind surfaces contributes to more adequate explanations of life and to better societies. Lack of such imaginative entry to others' minds brings 'psychological narcissism, of citizens who have difficulty connecting to other human beings with a sense of the human significance of the issues at stake ' (2001a: 426) .
 They show the joy and value of some things -including play and fun -in themselves, not merely as items for use. In sum, Nussbaum claims that imaginative literature 'provides insights that should play a role (though not as uncriticized foundations) in the construction of an adequate moral and political theory; second, that it develops moral capacities without which citizens will not succeed in making reality out of the normative conclusions of any moral or political theory, however excellent ' (1995c: 12) . It can, not least, 'contribute to the dismantling of the stereotypes that support group hatred' (p. 92).
Some literary theorists suggest that imaginative literature is potentially uniquely good in these roles. They see 'literature as a distinctive mode of thought about being human' (Haines 1998: 21) . Whether 'literature' extends beyond novels, poems and plays, to essays, biography, travelogues and literary criticism, is debated. For development ethics, real narratives are vitally important, probably even more so than fiction. Consider for example the impact of works of biography and autobiography from China, such as Wild Swans (Chang, 1991) and Son of the Revolution (Heng & Shapiro 1983) . However Nussbaum's main focus and that of much of the related discussion is on imaginative writing, with a claim that this has special features. It takes us into a variety of other minds, in ways that other forms-even perhaps poly-vocal reportage-may be less able to.
The thick language of literature 'expresses our moral intuitions in a way that the "thin" language [of much philosophy] does not', argues Parker (1998: 10) , drawing on Charles Taylor's Sources of the Self. Restriction to the thin languages of philosophy leads us to talk about something else than our real moral thoughts. In reaction to the 16 th and 17 th centuries' Wars of Religion in Europe, Enlightenment ethics chose to proceed with a conception of persons as individual reasoners only, neglecting their other features and capacities, even their processes of maturation as persons. 'The abstract moral deliberator has no capacities that can be shown only through their development', unlike in the richer moral psychology seen in the Bildungsroman (Diamond 1998: 52) . Various philosophers now make such points at a general level.
Nussbaum is 'a distinguished exception' in providing also in-depth readings of literature, remarks Haines (1998: 30) . This adds weight to her view on whether imaginative literature can be a substitute for philosophical ethics. She concludes rather that the two provide complementary ways of thinking ethically and that literary criticism mediates between the two (Haines, p.32).
Pictures provide a sister route by which sympathy is aroused or withheld.
Pictures have a special power but also a simplicity and, by virtue of the very openness and underspecification which can stimulate our imaginations, a proneness to distorted interpretation. Our facility in mentally inventing scenarios often brings the danger that we think we understand when in fact we don't (Becker 1998) . Written accounts call forth images too but try to inform our interpretation more. Novels typically elaborate the linking scenarios more carefully, to ensure that we understand with more care and depth. They try to not just show a process in their characters, but to induce its counterpart in the reader. Building a sense of real people through evocative detail, recounting situations and events in which we could imagine ourselves, and drawing out their unforeseen consequences, can engage our sympathy for those described.
Wayne Booth argued in The Rhetoric of Fiction that sympathy 'is technically produced and controlled by the devices of access, closeness and distance' (Nair 2000: 114) . First: 'We are more likely to sympathise with people when we have a lot of information about their inner lives, motivation, fears, etc. ' (p.110) . This is the method eschewed by economics (and by pictures from afar), whose analyses strictly ration the requirements for both information and sympathy, following Sir Dennis Robertson's premise that nothing is scarcer, relative to requirements, than love for one's fellow man (Robertson 1956 ). Second: 'We sympathise with people when we see other people who do not share our access to their inner lives [DG: e.g., sometimes external economists] judging them harshly or incorrectly. In life we get this kind of information through intimacy and friendship. In fiction we get it through the narrator…or through direct access to the minds of the characters' (pp. 110-11). Thirdly, 'Information alone cannot necessarily elicit a sympathetic response. Sometimes it is the careful control of the flow of information, which controls a reader's judgement. ' (p.111) . When a reader shares information that he knows one character has and another lacks, it tends to place him in the former's shoes and on their side. A third person narrator may present events to us but through the protagonist's eyes, thus making us see her with both distance and involvement.
Novels can cast particular light on how 'the self comes into being as a dialogic process' (Hillis Miller, cited by Parker 1998: 13), rather than being inherent like the kernel of a nut. Identity can be seen, says Nair, firstly as derived from the relationships between persons, 'the system of differences through which individuality is constructed / structured'; and secondly 'as a narrative. The only way to explain who we are is to tell our own story' (Nair 2000: 109) . This takes us beyond Sen's picture of identity as simply multi-dimensional (Sen 2006) , to reflect on how persons' valuations in those dimensions arise and evolve within systems of social relationships which also evolve.
Nussbaum proposes that 'there are some moral views which can be adequately expressed only through novels', thanks to their scale and style of investigation (Diamond 1998: 39) . The central moral payoff from novels is not only from following what the characters experience and how they choose, but, says Nussbaum, even more from following how the novelist reflects on this. The reflection comes not as formal general arguments; although those are what most philosophers search for from literature, often impervious to its ambiguities, warn Diamond, Nussbaum and others.
Literature offers no propositional systems but builds our sensitivity and imaginationour heart and soul (Adamson 1998: 89) . Philosophers in practical ethics sometimes use cases intensively, but only as illustrations, for building general classifications, guidelines and codes. To protect anonymity and to abstract sufficiently in order to try to establish general principles, they 'routinely alter [cases'] setting and culture, supposing that this leaves the "essential" aspects of the case untouched' (Wiltshire 1998: 188) .
Yet the particular details may be central to the meaning of the case. Wiltshire argues that given the situational specificity and complexity of cases, and the prevalence of vital aspects which are not tidily commensurable, we should not rely on general rulebooks but on educated judgement based on deep immersion and the use of educated emotions. Personal narratives written by participants, for example those involved in 'complex emergencies', can offer such immersion and education. They tell real histories, not anecdotes or reductive simplifications or momentary situation reports, with attention to the emotions involved and the context of whole lives. The narratives illustrate conflicting viewpoints, real time pressures, unforeseen events and undesired effects, and the transformation of perspectives in the face of extreme experiences (Wiltshire 1998: 188-9) . They fulfil most of the functions which Nussbaum identifies as required in ethics, and with more realism than in nearly all fiction. Her own work presents various narratives, real and fictional, which essay these tasks.
Adamson fears that Nussbaum is overly prone to impose a lucid order, find a ready answer, rather than sometimes live with indeterminacy. Nussbaum repeatedly
declares she is open to that (e.g., 2001b: 14) , and insists that a literary work be read as a whole, not dipped into for selected illustrations. Literature maintains our awareness that there is more in life than we know or understand, whereas so much ethics is narrowly, overconfidently knowing (Diamond 1998: 51) . So, literature can help build sensitivity and imagination, as well as help us to respond and act (e.g., Nussbaum
2001b: xvii, Ch.7). It can generate questions, perception of possibilities and, says
Adamson, a sense of people's lives-rather than by itself give answers to 'How should we live?', let alone a full and adequate general conception of 'Life' (1998: 104).
Nussbaum concurs.
-CAVEATS: ETHOS, COMPASSION, BUILDING A RESEARCH MOVEMENT
Range of sources
Sen, Nussbaum and the UN Human Development Reports conclude that not all things of major importance are commensurable, neither when we think of life as a whole nor when we discuss public policy. We therefore need to evaluate by using diverse sets of Another deepening of the approach, to some eyes and in terms of both argument and tone, comes in Nussbaum's thorough and sympathetic response to the criticism that spiritual and religious aspirations were slighted in her previous accounts of central capabilities. She now highlights religion as a legitimate response to needs for expression, association, and affiliation (2001a: 419), while maintaining principled limits to the free exercise of religion; it is not to be free of reason, consistency, and humanity.
One further strength is her practice sometimes of the style of 'internal criticism', expounded in a 1989 paper written jointly with Sen. They argued that the range of intellectual sources and resources within a culture provide bases for it to learn and evolve, including in response to influences from outside, rather than by demanding acceptance of 'parachuted in' external packages of ideas that may lack local resonance, relevance or acceptability. Commentators and critics are likely to have more influence if they build to a great extent on internal sources and resources. Hans Küng's global ethics project offers a good example of how to build from within as well as without (Küng 1997 Nussbaum's formulations on capabilities must be understood however as not just a priority list, but as a way of proceeding, a broad approach to ethics and human development. This paper has centred not on fine-tuning a list and details of the approach's theory of the good, but on the roles of a list and the approach's other components. We identified and considered major elements other than those which refer directly to capabilities: ideas about audiences and purposes, background concepts and values, including concepts of personhood and emotion, and the approach's sources and methods for obtaining and interpreting materials. We considered how the choices of purpose, audience, and stage of work could influence the choices of methods and sources.
Various choices of audience and of the line and timespan of projected influence are legitimate. Nussbaum's focus matches some essential arenas, purposes and audiences. She seeks longer run influence on constitutional and legal frameworks and on political culture, in order to buttress compassion, cosmopolitan concern and human rights. She aims to influence how people listen, see and act, and thus to change listeners, not only their information set. We saw for example that Sen's hypothesis that a democracy will prevent famines relies on a degree of felt political community. If there is little such community, crippling shortage amongst marginal groups may not receive attention and concern in the national or even regional metropoli, let alone internationally. Given the extent and even growth of selfishness and narrow group-ism both globally and intra-nationally, for example in relation to climate change, Nussbaum's attention to the bases of concern for others is highly relevant in policy ethics, not only in personal ethics. Her time horizon is consciously relatively long term, as reflected in her stress on upgrading of school and college education, not least in rich countries (1997, 2010) .
We see then the pertinence of her focus on the analysis and education of emotions, especially compassion. Nussbaum connects the worlds of socio-economic and philosophical discussion of human development to these more intimate realms. For social and development policy, the emotion of compassion may be central, and
Nussbaum provides a rich examination. She points out its vulnerability to narrowly defensive specifications of who is within the universe of moral consideration, of how seriously they are or would be harmed by a situation, and of how far they are themselves to blame for it. However, one can doubt Nussbaum's adoption of the Aristotelian conceptualization of compassion as necessarily or contingently arising only when a misfortune is undeserved. A non-desert criterion is relevant, but to make it essential may be questionable.
We can gratefully endorse Nussbaum's advocacy of intent study of imaginative literature in order to examine and educate compassion and the emotions more generally, though with a proviso that the power of 'Great Books' for many audiences can be exaggerated. Questions remain about the balance between types of literature (fictional, historical, biographical, autobiographical etc.) , and about how one might feasibly and effectively promote such study within the confines of education in social sciences and the professions, even in international development studies. We cannot look to Nussbaum for all these answers; it is an area that demands ongoing work (cf. Lewis et al., 2008 ).
Nussbaum's enormous agenda brings a need for many types of evidence, collaboration and interaction. Perceptions of her own degrees of empathy, compassion, mercy and cosmopolitanism become important, especially given the frequency of reactions elsewhere against Americans from elite settings. In debate with those who differ, and in seeking to attract cooperators and fellow travellers, tact and tactics are vital. Nussbaum's writings overall are impressively empathetic, compassionate, judicious, and merciful; but with some possible lapses, of commission (in disputes) and omission (in collaborations). We can learn from how effectively Sen has fostered a major research programme through building collegiality, networks and partnerships and through defusing resistance. He has attracted and kept the support or attention of a wide family of potential collaborators and potential users.
While it was useful to itemize and contrast the contents of Sen's and Nussbaum's approaches, as was attempted here, neither approach is fixed and finished.
The purpose of the comparison was to better understand what they say; to try to assist each of these sister programmes to improve; and to promote a well articulated connection and a productive and cooperative working relationship between them. We require a capability/capabilities/post-capabilities approach that transcends and outlives its founders, and that contributes effectively towards human development.
